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Grayson: The Effect of a Conflict Between the Granting and Habendum Clause

THE EFFECT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
GRANTING AND HABENDUM CLAUSES
IN DEEDS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
In many actions involving real estate the court must determine what estates or interests pass under deeds which
contain conflicting clauses. Many courts in seeking the intention of the parties, consider the whole deed together, without
undue preference to any particular part.' However, the court
in South Carolina has stated that while the intention of the
parties should govern, it cannot violate established rules
of law.2 The purpose of this note is to discuss the technical
common law rule of property which must be followed when
there is a conflict between the granting and habendum clauses
in a deed.
At common law the formal parts of a deed consist of the
premises, the habendum, the tenendum, the reddendum, the
3
conditions, the warranty, the covenants and the conclusion.
The premises is that part of the deed preceding the habendum
that sets forth the number and names of the parties, recitals
necessary to explain the transaction, the consideration, the
certainty of the grantor and the grantee and the thing
granted. 4 Within the premises is found the granting clause
which usually reads: " . . . and by these presents do grant,
bargain, sell and release unto the said [grantee] ... " Early
South Carolina cases refer to repugnancy between premises
and habendum, 5 whereas later cases refer to a conflict between granting and habendum clauses.6 However, there seems
to be little distinction between the terms "premises" and
"grant" when they are used in the technical rule under discussion.
Following the premises is the habendum, which limits the
estate to be taken by the grantee, and is usually introduced
1. PATTON, TITES § 124 (1938).

2. Sandford v. Sandford, 106 S. C. 304, 91 S. E. 294 (1916); Steele

v. Williams, 204 S. C. 124, 28 S. E. 2d 644 (1944).
3. 1 DEVLIN, DEEDS § 176 (1887).
4. McLeod v. Tarrant, 39 S. C. 271, 17 S. E. 773, 20 L. R. A. 846
(1892).
5. Ingram v. Porter, 4 McCord 198 (S. C. 1827) ; McLeod v. Tarrant,
note 4 supra.

6. Wilson v. Poston, 129 S. C. 345, 123 S. E. 849 (1924); Rhodes v.
Black, 170 S. C. 193, 170 S. E. 158 (1933).
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by the words "to have and to hold." The office of the habendum is properly to determine what estate or interest is
granted by the deed.7 At common law it can enlarge, explain
or qualify the estate granted in the premises, but it cannot
contradict or defeat such estate." According to Chancellor
Kent "it has degenerated into a mere useless form; and the
premises now contain the specification of the estate granted,
and the deed becomes effectual without any habendum." 9
Today most deeds drawn in South Carolina follow the form
set out in a statute enacted in 1795.10 The form provided by
that statute as sufficient to pass a fee simple title is composed of premises, habendum and warranty. However, the
statute does not abrogate the forms of conveyance at common
law, but merely set out a form which can be followed. Thus,
since the enactment of the statute it has been held that an
informal paper intended as a conveyance, under seal and with
two witnesses, but without habendum or warranty clauses,
may operate to convey title as a bargain and sale.',
GENERAL RULE

Where the habendum clause is repugnant to or in irreconcilable conflict with the granting clause, the rule at common
law is that the granting clause controls and the habendum is
void. 12 To be effective the habendum must be consistent with
the granting clause. 13 However, in determining whether there
is irreconcilable conflict between the two clauses, the court
will consider the whole deed together and give effect to every
14
part, if all can stand consistently with law.
One general rule of construction which would seem to support this technical rule is that in case of a conflict between
two provisions in a deed, the last should yield to the first and
the first should be given its full effect. 15 This follows the
7. See note 4 supra; ELPHINSTONE, RULES FOR THE INTERPRETATION
OF DuEDs 226 (1889).
8. Co. LITT. § 299a; 1 DEmBITZ, LAND TITLES § 47 (1895).
9. 4 KENT 468.
10. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 57-251.
11. Lorick & Lowrance v. McCreery, 20 S. C. 424 (1882).

12. Rhodes v. Black, note 6 supra; 1 DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 3,

§ 214.

13. Wilson v. Poston, note 6 supra.
14. Chancellor v. Windham, 1 Rich. 161, 42 Am. Dec. 411 (S. C. 1844).
15. Bowman v. Lobe, 14 Rich. Eq. 271 (S.C. 1868); Rhodes v. Black,
note 6 supra; ELPHINSTONE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 125.
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ancient maxim that the first clause of a deed and the last
clause of a will shall operate. 16
A second rule of construction leading to the result that the
granting clause prevails over a repugnant habendum is that
the words in a deed will be construed most strongly against
him who uses them. 17 By this rule the grantor is prevented
from contradicting or retracting by a subsequent part of the
deed. Thus, the habendum is not allowed to destroy an estate
already vested by the granting clause.
Another basis for holding that the granting clause controls
is that where the estate has been clearly defined and expressed
in the granting clause, the habendum will not be allowed to
defeat the clearly expressed intention of the grantor in the
granting clause. Hence, after a clear grant of the fee, nothing
in the deed thereafter can cut down the estate so conveyed.',
MODERN RULE

As opposed to the technical rule, the modern and now widely
accepted rule to determine what estate is conveyed when
there is repugnancy between granting and habendum clauses
in a deed is "that, if the intention of the parties is apparent
from an examination of a deed 'from its four corners' without
regard to its technical and formal divisions, it will be given
effect even though, in doing so, technical rules of construction
will be violated."'19 The courts of California, Kentucky and
North Carolina were the first to hold that the rule that a
repugnant habendum must be rejected as void is not a rule of
property, but is merely a rule of construction which will be
resorted to only where the courts cannot determine which of
the clauses was intended to be controlling.20 The modern view
is that the intention of the parties must be given effect when
ascertainable, so that when it appears from a consideration
of the entire instrument and attendant circumstances that
the grantor intended the habendum to enlarge, restrict or
repugn the granting clause, the habendum must control.2 '
16. Fraser v. Boone, 1 Hill Eq. 360 (S. C. 1833); SHEP. ToUCH.88.

17. Peay v. Boggs, 2 Mill Const. 98, 12 Am. Dec. 656 (S. C. 1818);
Coleman v. Gaskin, 165 S. C. 301, 163 S. E. 790 (1932); ELPHINSTON,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 127 and at 233.

18. Shealy v. Shealy, 120 S. C. 276, 113 S. E. 131 (1922).
19. Annot., 84 A. L. R. 1054, 1063 (1933).
20. Barnett v. Barnett, 104 Cal. 298, 37 Pac. 1049 (1894); Bodine v.
Arthur, 91 Ky. 53, 34 Am. St. Rep. 162 (1890); Tripplett v. Williams,
149 N. C. 394, 63 S. E.79, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 514 (1908).
21. Bodine v. Arthur, note 20 supra.
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SOUTH CAROLINA APPROACH

The South Carolina approach to this rule can be simplified
by the use of A, B and C situations. Therefore, that treatment
will be used in the following discussion.
1. Grant
Habendum
Deed from A to B.
To B and his heirs.
A deed in this form conveys a fee simple absolute estate to

the grantee. 22 At common law the court resorts to the habendum to ascertain the grantor's intention where an incomplete
23
or indefinite estate is conveyed by the granting clause.
Since the above deed lacks words of inheritance in the granting clause, which by implication is construed to be a life estate, 24 the court may, by resorting to the habendum, enlarge
the implied life estate into a fee simple absolute estate.2 5
Also, such a deed, containing words of limitation only in the
habendum, is in the form set out in the statute26 for the conveying of an estate in fee simple.
2. Grant
Habendum
Deed from A to B for life.
To B and his heirs.
At common law a deed in this form conveys a fee simple
absolute estate. 27 While it is a well settled common law rule
that the premises prevail over a repugnant habendum, the
premises control only to the extent that an estate specifically
limited in the granting clause cannot be abridged or cut down
to a less estate by language in the habendum. 28 Thus, the inconsistencies of the above deed are reconciled by the common
law rule which permits the habendum to enlarge the estate
granted in the premises.2 0 Although the court in South Carolina has stated that where the habendum of the deed is wholly
inconsistent with the premises, it must be rejected,30 it was
22. 1 DEvLIN, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 220, 215; SHEP. ToucH. 102;
op. cit. supra note 7, at 231.

ELPHINSTONE,

23. McLeod v. Tarrant, note 4 supra; Smith v. Clinkscales, 102 S. C.
227, 35 S. E. 1064 (1915); Wilson v. Poston, note 6 supra; Groce v.
Southern R. Co., 164 S. C. 427, 162 S. E. 425 (1931).
24. Varn v. Varn, 32 S. C. 77, 10 S. E. 829 (1889).
25. Cresswell v. Bank of Greenwood, 210 S. C. 47, 41 S. E. 2d 393
(1947).
26. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 57-251.

27. Co. Litt. § 299a.
28. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 980 (3rd ed. 193D).
29. ELPHINSTONE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 233.

30. Ingram v. Porter, note 5 supra; Wilson v. Poston, note 6 supra;

Rhodes v. Black, note 6 supra.
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evidently intended for this rule to apply only where the
habendum invalidated or cut down the estate specifically limited in the granting clause. 31 Accordingly, a deed in the above
form conveys a fee simple absolute in South Carolina.
Suppose, however, that the grantor conveyed "to B for
life, then to C and his heirs" in the granting clause, with the
habendum "to B and his heirs". Since the granting clause of
such a deed conveys the entire estate, no further disposition
can be made of the property elsewhere in the deed. A deed
in this latter form, therefore, gives B only a life estate and
a vested remainder in fee simple to C.32
3. Grant
Deed from A to B (words of inheritance omitted), but if
he die without issue living at his death, over.
Habendum
To B and his heirs.
In two cases in which the South Carolina court has been
called upon to construe deeds similar in form to the one
above, it held that a fee defeasible, rather than an estate
in fee simple absolute, was conveyed. After finding that the
grantor plainly indicated his intention that the grantee should
take a fee defeasible estate, the court in Wilson v. Poston33
sought a construction of the deed clauses separately and together so that the estate held to be conveyed was reconcilable
with both clauses and utilized the terms of each. It was stated
that "where a complete estate is not created in the granting
clause, which contains a conditional limitation, and resort
must be had to the habendum for the purposes of enlarging
the incomplete estate created by the granting clause, the
granting clause must be taken as it stands, with the conditional limitation." Similar reasoning had been used in the
earlier case of Smith v. Clinkscales34 to reach a like result.
31. In Zobel v. Little, 120 S. C. 212, 113 S. E. 68 (1922), where the
deed was essentially the same as the form in the illustration, the court
held that the habendum enlarged the life estate in the granting clause
into a fee simple absolute.
32. This latter illustration is the essence of the deed in Barrett v.
Still, 102 S. C. 19, 86 S. E. 204 (1915), where the court held that B took
a life estate and C took a vested remainder in fee simple.

33. Note 6 supra.
34. Note 23 supra; note also, McLeod v. Tarrant, note 4 stpra, where

the grant was "to A" with the habendum "to A and B and their heirs."

In holding that a fee simple absolute estate passed to both A and B,
the court reasoned that since no words of inheritance were coupled with
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4. Grant
Deed from A to B and his heirs, but if he die without issue
living at his death, over.
Habendum
To B and his heirs.
In construing a deed almost identical to the above illustration, the court in McDaniel v. Conner3 5 held that a fee
defeasible estate passed to the grantee. In that case the court
stated that the clearly expressed intention of the grantor
to pass a defeasible fee had in fact been accomplished without contravening a rule of law. In reaching that decision,
which appears to be a reversal of earlier cases,3 6 the court
apparently disregarded the reasoning that the validity of the
conditional limitation depended upon the presence or absence of words of inheritance in the granting clause,3 7 for it
is stated: "Suppose the words 'his lawful heirs after him' had
been omitted from the granting clause, after the name of the
grantee, could there be any doubt of the grantor's intention
and the legal effect of the deed, in view of the habendum,
regular and statutory in form to vest the fee-simple title?
Undoubtedly, no. Then, does the presence of the quoted words
indicate an intention to restrict the named grantee to a life
estate (otherwise not done by the terms of the deed) and
create remainders in his children (which is appellants' contention) ? Plainly again, no."
5. Grant
Deed from A to B.
Habendum
To B and his heirs, but if he die without issue living at
his death, over.
No South Carolina case involving a deed in exactly this
form has been found, so it appears that the question is still
open as to what estate a deed in this form will convey. However, in view of the recent decision of McDaniel v. Conner,3 8
the estate vested in the grantee in the granting clause, the habendum
must be used to enlarge the estate and a person mentioned for the first
time in the habendum will be admitted to be a grantee in the deed.

35, 206 S. C.96, 33 S. E. 2d 75 (1945).

36. Edwards v. Edwards, 2 Strob. Eq. 101 (S. C. 1848); Glenn v.
Jamison, 48 S. C. 316, 26 S. E. 677 (1896) ; See 5 S. C. L. Q. 73 (1952).
37. See notes 33 and 34 supra.
38. Note 35 supra; see also notes 33 and 34 supra. Note that the
estate conveyed by the granting clause in the illustrative deed is incom-
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which held valid an executory interest preceded by words of
inheritance in the granting clause, there is reason to believe
that the court will hold that a fee defeasible estate, instead
of a fee simple absolute estate, passes under a deed in the
above form because the common law rule that no new estate
can be created after a conveyance of fee simple absolute3 9
does not apply to a case of a mere possibility of the divesting
of the fee simple estate by reason of the occurrence of some
future contingency. The grantee has, in spite of this divest40
ing clause, an estate in fee simple and not a life estate.
6. Grant
Deed from A to B and his heirs.
Habendum
To B for life.
It is clear that a deed in this form conveys a fee simple
absolute estate to the grantee. 41 By this deed two separate
and inconsistent estates have purportedly been conveyed.
Therefore, because of the irreconcilable repugnancy between
the two estates, the deed must be construed in accordance
with the common law rule that the granting clause conveying
the larger estate cannot be limited by the habendum clause
reducing that estate.42
plete; hence, resort must be had to the habendum to ascertain the
grantor's intention. Cf. Antley v. Antley, 132 S. C. 306, 128 S. E. 31

(1925), where the court held void an executory interest after a grant of
a fee simple conditional estate in the habendum, the granting clause

containing no words of inheritance. However, the question with respect
to the executory interest was purely academic, since the grantee had
discharged the condition burdening her fee conditional estate by having
had born unto her lawful bodily issue and having in her life time conveyed away the fee vested in her.
39. Shealy v. Shealy, note 18 supra. In Keels v. Croswell, 180 S. C. 63,
185 S. E. 39 (1936), the granting clause of the deed was said to be regular, which may be supposed to mean in accordance with the statutory
form in South Carolina where the granting clause of the deed contains
no words of inheritance. The habendum contained words of inheritance
followed by a clause purporting to limit the grantee to a life estate with
remainder to his issue, if he had any such issue surviving him at the
time of his death, if not, then the remainder over. There it was held that
a fee simple absolute estate was conveyed which the grantor could not
thereafter cut down to a lesser estate.
40. TiFFANY, op. cit. supra note 28, § 980.
41. A deed like the one in the illustration was found in Shealy v.
Shealy, note 18 supra, where the court held that a fee simple absolute
estate was conveyed and that nothing in the deed thereafter could change
or cut down the estate so conveyed.
42. ELPHINSTONE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 234.
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7. G ant
Deed from A to B and his heirs, reservation of life estate
to A.
Habendum
To B and his heirs.
It is settled in South Carolina that a deed in this form will
pass a fee simple estate to B subject to a life estate reserved
to A. 43 The most recent case involving a deed in this form is
Glasgow v. Glasgow, 44 where the lower court held void the
reservation of a life estate to the grantor and his wife as an
attempt to cut down by superadded words the fee simple

absolute granted in the granting clause, and also, because the
wife had no former interest in the premises and was a stranger to the deed. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the
lower decision on both grounds and held that the deed conveyed a fee simple absolute subject to life estates reserved
in the grantor and his wife. The court in that case quoted
from 16 AAI. JuR., Deeds § 305, which is as follows: "Anciently, exceptions seem to have been inserted in the premises
of the deed just before the habendum clause. It is not, however, necessary that exceptions appear in that position. It is
said that a reservation may be inserted in any part of the
deed. The view has been taken that the position ordinarily
occupied by the reddendum clause may be used to effect a
reservation of an estate in land previously granted, or it may
be used for excepting a severable thing from the premises
granted, and that in whatever part the clause appears, the
deed will be construed to give effect thereto, if possible, as
well as to the granting clause. However, there is authority
to the effect that where no exception is made in the granting
clause of a deed, an exception in the habendum clause is ineffective." The court also quoted from 26 C. J. S., Deeds § 138
(a), in part as follows: "Where not repugnant to the grant,
a reservation or exception may appear in any part of the
deed. However, the reservation or exception must be to the
grant, not to some other provision in the deed .... "
Although the courts recognize a reservation of a life estate
to the grantor after a grant of the fee simple in the granting
clause, it should be noted that apparently no case has con43. Senterfeit v. Rogers, 71 S. C. 259, 51 S. E. 142 (1904).

44. 221 S. C. 322, 70 S. E. 2d 432 (1952), noted in 4 S. C. L. Q. 561.
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strued a deed in the following form: Grant: Deed from A to B
and his heirs; Habendum: To B and his heirs, reserving a life
estate in A.45 If the court is ever called upon to construe such
a deed, it may hold the reservation valid in light of the Glasgow case wherein it was stated that a reservation may be
inserted in any part of the deed.
8. Grant
Deed from A to B and his heirs.
Habendum
To B and his heirs, reserving a right of way across the land
conveyed and excepting the oil, gas and mineral rights.
There is no question about the right of a landowner to convey his land, reserving a right of way across the land4 6 and
excepting the oil, gas and mineral rights. 47 However, this
general statement is subject to the well settled common law
rule that where a full grant of the fee is made in a deed
by the granting clause, any reservation or exception which
has the effect of destroying the fee granted is void because
of repugnancy.4 8 Of course, if the reservation or exception
is explicable without destroying the grant in whole or in part,
there is no repugnancy. The question presented here, which
apparently has not been decided in South Carolina, is whether
the reservation and exception following the habendum are
void because of repugnancy with the granting clause conveying the full fee. While at least one state49 has answered this
question in the affirmative, the general view today is that
"the limiting of the general words of a grant by an exception
is not regarded as rendering the exception void for repugnancy, regardless of the position in the instrument which the
45. In Page v. Lewis, 209 S.C. 212, 39 S. E. 2d 787 (1946), where the
court set aside an identical deed on the grounds of undue influence, it
was said by way of dictum that the deed conveyed an unqualified fee
simple in both the premises and the habendum, which estate could not
be cut down by subsequent language in the deed. The court probably
will repudiate this dictum if called upon in the future to decide the
question. See McDougal v. Musgrave, 46 W. Va. 509, 33 S. E. 281
(1899), where a reservation of a life estate placed after the habendum
clause was held valid.
46. Amnot., 28 A. L. R. 2d 243 (1953).
47. Annot., 37 A. L. R. 2d 1440 (1954).
48. For example, if there is a specific grant of 20 acres of land, the
exception of one acre is void for repugnancy. But if a tract of land is
conveyed in general terms, an exception of one or two acres is not repugnant. 5 AM. & ENG. ENCY. LAW, p. 456.
49. Cole v. Collie, 131 Ark. 103, 198 S.W. 710 (1917) ; Mason v. Jackson, 194 Ark. 236, 106 S.W. 2d 610, 111 A. L. R. 1071 (1931).
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exception occupies with reference to the granting part of the
deed. Ordinarily, the granting clause and the clause making
the reservation or exception will be reconciled, and effect
will be given to both."5 0 The courts5 l following this latter
view have refused to apply the rule that the granting clause
prevails over a repugnant habendum for the reason that at
common law neither the reservation nor the exception constitute a part of the habendum, but are separate and inde-

pendent clauses, whereas, the habendum, being only a definition of the premises, must yield in case of repugnancy because
its terms are subsidiary to the premises.
At common law when anything is to be reserved out of the
property granted, it is properly done by the clause of reddendum which commonly follows that of the habendum.5 2 Under
the pure feudal system the office of the reddendum was employed to set forth the return to the grantor, consisting principally of military services.5 3 Since the abolition of the feudal
incidents of tenure, it is properly used to reserve an annual
or periodical rent as compensation or return for the property
granted. 4 It is also used to effect a reservation of some
easement or servitude incapable of severance from the grant.55
The reddendum is not regarded as being repugnant to the
premises since it merely sets forth the terms of stipulation
upon which the grant is made. Both clauses are deemed to
be in equal dignity and virtue, thus being read together and
allowed effect and operation.56
At common law the exception is customarily and properly
inserted in the premises just after the description of the
thing granted, but it may be in any part of the deed.5 7 It is a
clause of a deed whereby the grantor excepts something out
of that which he has before granted. 58 Accordingly, a portion
of an estate is withheld from the operation of the grant. There
is no legal repugnancy between the granting clause and the
exception because they perform the same function, namely
50. 16 Am. JUR., Deeds § 303 (1938).
51. M eDougal v. Musgrave, note 45 supra; Freudenberger Oil Co. v.
Simmons, 75 W. Va. 337, 83 S. E. 995 (1914).
52. 1 DmvLIN, op. cit. supra note 22, § 221.
53. 2 BL. Comm. - 29 9 .
54. 2 MIN. INS. 630.

55.
56.
57.
58.

See note 52 supra.
Freudenberger Oil Co. v. Simmons, note 51 supra.
SHEP. ToucH. 77.
See note 52 supra.
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expression of primary intent. 59 Thus, it follows logically that
the exception placed after the habendum clause in a deed is

not void for repugnancy with the granting clause.
9. Grant
Deed from A to B and his heirs.
Habendum
To B and his heirs, imposing restrictive building covenant.
The validity of the building restriction placed after the
habendum is apparently an open question in South Carolina
since no cases have been found construing a deed in the above
form. Since a restrictive building covenant may be in the
form of a condition, or a covenant, or of a reservation or
exception in the deed, 60 it will only be necessary to discuss the
condition and covenant here, the reservation and exception
having been previously discussed. At common law conditions,
limitations and similar agreements properly appear after the
habendum or reddendum, but may be in any other part of the
deed and be equally effectual."' However, the restriction must
be imposed in a manner that is good as a condition or a covenant, but in no other form. 62 According to one case,63 a statement respecting the use or purpose for which the land was
granted does not lessen the effect of the language in the
granting clause in the absence of certain characteristic clauses
or words which indicate that the vesting or continuance of the
estate is to depend upon the condition. Moreover, conditions
which are repugnant to the nature of the estate granted are
not sustained.

4

10. Grant
Deed from A to B and his heirs in trust to convey to C
and his heirs.
Habendum
To B and his heirs in trust to convey to C and his heirs,
reservation of life estate to A.
The deed here, known as a trust deed, derives its character
59. Freudenberger Oil Co. v. Simmons, note 51 supra.
.60. 14 Am. JuR., Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions § 195 (1938).
61. MARTINDALB, CONVEYANGING § 121 (1882).
62. Craig v. Wells, 11 N. Y. 315 (1854).
63. Allen v. Trustees of Great Neck Free Church, 269 N. Y. S. 341
(1934).
64. Thus, an imposition of a condition in a deed that the grantee is
not to mortgage or in any wise dispose of the land is void as an attempt
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and qualities from rules adopted by courts of equity.65 Although these rules conform as strictly as possible to the rules
of common law which govern legal estates,6 6 nevertheless, it
has been held in South Carolina that a court of equity in its
jurisdiction over trusts, not being bound by the technical rules
of common law, will seek the intention of the grantor from
the whole instrument.0 7 Thus, the clauses of a deed may be
transposed in order to give effect to the intention of the
grantor."" No case has been found in South Carolina dealing
with a deed as shown in the illustration, but since it is a
trust deed, the court of equity may, if necessary, transpose
the reservation in the habendum to the granting clause and
thus effectuate the intention of the grantor by holding the
reservation valid.
11. Grant
Deed from A to B and his
heirs.

Habendum
To B and the heirs of his
body.

Although no South Carolina cases involving a deed in the
above form has been found, the issue under a construction of
such a deed is whether a fee simple absolute estate or a fee
simple conditional estate is created. The fee simple conditional
estate was abolished in England in 1285 by the Statute De
Donis 0 which replaced it with the fee tail. South Carolina
never adopted the Statute De Donis70 and therefore the state
is in the awkward position of purporting to follow the law in
existence in feudal England before the year 1285. In view
of the fact that today there is no comprehensive authority on
to convey an estate in fee simple and deprive the owner of the incidents
of ownership, no matter where it is placed in the deed.

Sandford v.

Sandford, note 2 supra.
65. 2 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY 489 (4th ed. 1876).

66. Co. LrrT. 290 b, § 16.
67. McMichael v. McMichael, 51 S. C. 555, 29 S. E. 403 (1897); Holden
v. Melvin, 106 S. C. 245, 91 S. E. 97 (1916).

68. McCown v. King, 23 S. C. 232 (1885), is the leading case holding
that clauses of a deed may be transposed in order to arrive at the intention of the grantor. The cases of Folk v. Graham, 82 S. C. 66, 62 S. E.
1106 (1907); Rhodes v. Black, 170 S. C. 193, 170 S. E. 158 (1933); and
First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank of Cola. v. Ford, 177 S. C. 40,
180 S. E. 562 (1935), each list the above statement as a rule of construction, but in none of them is the rule applied.
69. De Donis Conditionalibus, St. Westm. II, 13 Edw. I c. 1 (1285).
70. See, among other cases, Murrell v. Mathews, 2 Bay 397 (S. C.
1802); Cruger v. Heyward, 2 Des. 94 (S. C. 1802); Warnock v. Wightman, 1 Brevard 331 (S. C. 1804); Cresswell v. Bank of Greenwood, note
25 supra.
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the fee simple conditional estate as it existed prior to the
enactment of De Donis, the court will probably follow the
common law authority with respect to the fee tail. According
to the common law after the year 1285, " . . .although the
grant in the premises was to A and his 'heirs,' the habendum
might show that a fee tail only was created, this being regarded, not as abridging the estate granted, but as merely a
qualification of the word 'heirs' as first used."' 71 There is,
therefore, good reason to believe that the court will, if ever
confronted with the problem, find that a fee simple conditional
estate passes under a deed in the above form.
CONCLUSION

It appears from an examination of South Carolina cases
that the Court still regards the rule that a repugnant habendum must be rejected as void as a technical rule of property.
In construing deeds the court has said that intention is a
term of art, signifying the meaning of the writing; 72 but intention cannot override legal principles where words of settled
import are used and contrary principles are encountered.7 3 In
such cases the intention will be conclusively presumed to accord with the established meanings of the words and to conform to the fixed rules of law. This is quite differeiit from
the modern view which holds that the rule that a repugnant
habendum must be rejected as void is not a rule of property,
but is merely a rule of construction which will be resorted to
only where the court cannot determine which of the clauses
was intended to be controlling. The South Carolina court has
not adopted the modern view that the intention gathered from
the entire deed must control, but confines itself to an examination of the two clauses, treating the question of the intent of
the grantor as subordinate to the purpose of reconciliation.
However, an examination of the South Carolina cases on this
topic shows that the trend of the court is toward the modern
view and that the court will attempt to uphold the conveyance
in some form, rather than declare it void for repugnancy.
PATRICK H. GRAYSON, JR.
71. Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 28, § 980, n. 93.
72. Sandford v. Sandford, note 2 supra.
73. Cresswell v. Bank of Greenwood, note 25 supra.
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